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Abstract 
This paper empirically investigates the determinants of subordinated debt issuance 
by Japanese regional banks during the period 2000–2005 using a probit model. The 
empirical results suggest the following: (i) Throughout the period, Japanese 
regional banks with a lower capital/asset ratio have a higher incentive to issue 
subordinated debts because they are counted as Tier 2 capital under the Basel 
Accord. (ii) During the period of instability in the Japanese banking system 
(2000–2003), investors tended to intensively use financial variables such as the 
non-performing loan ratio, ROA, and total deposits outstanding to screen good 
banks for their investments in the subordinated debts. (iii) During the period after 
the banking system regained stability (2004–2005), investors tended to pay less 
attention to the above variables due mainly to the mitigated default risk of these 
banks. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper empirically investigates the determinants of subordinated debt issuance by Japanese 
regional banks during the period 2000–2005. There are several studies on this issue for U.S. banks. 
To the best of our knowledge, however, only Ito and Sasaki [2002] have examined this issue for 
Japanese banks.1 In Japan, a restructuring of the banking industry has been in progress. Due 
mainly to mergers, the number of city and regional banks decreased to 117 in April 2006 from 140 
in March 1994.2 
Through this process, subordinated debt has begun to attract public attention as a 
potential tool for disciplining banks. Since the mid-1980s, a number of proposals that would 
require large banks to issue subordinated debt on a mandatory basis have been made in the United 
States.3 Subordinated debt is a fixed-income instrument that is unsecured and senior only to 
common equity when a failed bank is liquidated. Thus, yields on subordinated debts in the 
secondary market should be the most sensitive to the banks’ default risk among debts because 
those bank creditors are likely to lose part of their principal and interest in the case of a failure. 
In fact, many studies have used the spread of subordinated debts issued by U.S. banks 
over Treasury bonds to investigate whether subordinated debt investors are sensitive enough to the 
credit risks. Relatively early studies, including Avery, Belton, and Goldberg [1988] and Gorton and 
Santomero [1990], show that (excessive) risk-taking by bank managers was not priced into 
subordinated debt spreads in the 1980s. Evidence from 1991 onward, on the other hand, which 
                                                  
1  Birchler and Hancock [2004] and Covitz, Hancock, and Kwast [2004a,b] empirically examine the issuance 
decision of subordinated debts by U.S. banks using a probit model. On the other hand, Ito and Sasaki [2002] 
examine how the risk-based capital standards imposed by the Basle Accord affected major Japanese banks’ 
issuance of subordinated debts in the early 1990s. They find a significant effect of the risk-based capital ratio 
on the change in the subordinated debt ratio, but they do not control for any other variables apart from time 
dummies.  
2  Because the number of category 1 regional banks did not change, the decrease in bank numbers comes 
from city banks and category 2 regional banks. 
3  Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and U.S. Treasury Department [2000] summarizes 
more than 10 subordinated debt proposals.   2
corresponds to the post FDICIA period, shows the opposite result: credit risk premiums can be 
extracted from U.S. subordinated debt spreads. In particular, Flannery and Sorescu [1996] argue that 
the no-pricing of credit risk until the 1980s was a rational response of investors to a “too-big-to 
fail” policy along with well-established perceptions of forbearance from bank closure, and once 
such an institutional framework was eliminated, subordinated debt investors began to price credit 
risk.4 
Unlike the case of large U. S. banks, however, until recently, Japanese banks found it very 
difficult to issue subordinated debts. Hence, an alternative approach to the Japanese case is to 
examine whether the primary debt market may discipline banks’ management instead of the 
secondary market.5 
This paper investigates the determinants of subordinated debt issuance by Japanese 
regional banks, focusing on the role of the primary market for subordinated debts in disciplining 
banks. If subordinated debt investors in the primary market properly discipline banks, then the 
banks that take on excessive risk or manage their assets poorly would have difficulty issuing 
subordinated debts.6 In analyzing the determinants of the issuance decision, we pay particular 
attention to the following two aspects that are more likely to apply to the recent Japanese situation. 
First, banks face the capital ratio regulation following the Basel Accord under which banks 
with (without) overseas operations need capital/asset ratios of at least eight (four) percent. Under 
the regulation, capital consists of (i) Tier 1 (shareholder equity and other forms of core capital), 
                                                  
4  Covitz, Hancock, and Kwast [2004] find that U.S. subordinated debt spreads were significantly risk-sensitive 
after 1985 using a two-step Heckman approach. Covitz and Harrison [2004] also report a “positive selection” 
attribute in that issuance tends to be timed with positive news announcements such as rating upgrades. 
5  In this regard, even in the United States, Covitz, Hancock, and Kwast [2004] show that the decision of U.S. 
banks to issue new subordinated debts depends on the market’s perception of banks’ default risk. 
6  Theoretically, if expected costs from issuing subordinated debts are sufficiently sensitive to banks’ default 
risk, then riskier banks may be less likely to issue subordinated debts. Moreover, as suggested by Birchler and 
Hancock [2004], the informed investor hypothesis tells us that a bank would issue subordinated debt upon 
the receipt of “good” news, while the bank would issue senior debt upon the receipt of “bad” news. Using 
this strategy, the bank attempts to separate investors using different, yet unobservable, beliefs on the default 
probability.   3
Tier 2 (supplementary capital), and Tier 3 (quasi-supplementary capital). Tier 2 is counted as capital 
up to the amount of the core capital and can be raised by issuing subordinated debts. Thus, banks 
with a lower capital/asset ratio are expected to have a higher incentive to issue subordinated debts. 
Because Japanese banks generally have had a lower capital/asset ratio than other advanced nations’ 
banks, this tendency is more likely to be observed in Japanese banks’ behavior. 
Second, during our sample period, the Japanese banking system experienced large ups and 
downs in terms of their financial standing. Specifically, the Japanese banking system had been 
unstable until 2003 after the bursting of the asset bubbles in the early 1990s. In particular, around 
2000-2002, Japanese financial authorities required banks to dispose of their non-performing loans 
(NPLs) under low capital buffer and thus default risk was heightened in financial markets such as 
the equity market. Since 2004, however, the NPL ratio has declined significantly for a number of 
Japanese banks because of intensive disposal of the NPLs, and equity prices have risen substantially 
with recovery of the Japanese economy.7  Recovery of banks’ soundness made it possible for many 
small regional banks that had struggled with the NPL problem to access debt and equity markets to 
enhance their still weak capital bases. In fact, the issuance number of subordinated debts has 
increased substantially since fiscal 2004. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical methodology 
and data. Section 3 reports the empirical results of the determinants of subordinated debt issuance 




                                                  
7  According to the Bank of Japan [2005], during the period from the early 1990s to 2003, losses from the 
disposal of NPLs exceeded or was almost equal to the net operating profits from core business on an 
aggregate basis for both city and regional banks. In fiscal 2004, however, the losses decreased to almost half 
the level of the latter, due mainly to the disposal of NPLs.   4
2.  Empirical Methodology and Data 
2.1 Empirical  Methodology 
We use a probit model in which the dependent variable  it Issue   is a binary variable that equals one 
if bank  i   issued subordinated debt in period  t   and zero otherwise. Specifically, the probit model 
can be written as: 
  () [] it it βX Φ = =1 Issue Prob  and  ( ) ( ) 1 Issue Prob 1 0 Issue Prob = − = = it it , 
where  Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function,  it X is the matrix of 
explanatory variables, and  β  is the vector of parameters to be estimated. 
 
2.2 Data 
We use yearly data from fiscal 2000 to 2005. We exclude city, trust, and long-term credit banks from 
our sample. The reason is that most of them experienced mergers during this period. Thus, we 
focus on regional banks in the analysis below. 8 In addition, we exclude the issuance of 
subordinated debts with provisions of conversion into equity, focusing on the determinants of 
straight subordinated debt issuance by the Japanese regional banks.9 As a result, the number of 
issuances in each fiscal year from 2000 to 2005 is 5, 2, 2, 3, 11, and 19, respectively.   
Another important point to note here is that most of the subordinated debts were issued 
in the last few months of each fiscal year. From a purely econometric point of view, we should use 
the balance sheet data as of the end of the previous fiscal year to avoid endogeneity problems. In 
reality, however, whether banks are able to issue subordinated debts is likely to be crucially 
dependent on the financial standing of banks just before the issuance. Thus, the use of the 
previous fiscal-year-end data may cause bias in the results because of the elimination of necessary 
                                                  
8  The banks that were merged or went bankrupt in the period 2000–2005 are excluded from the sample. 
9  The debt with provisions of conversion to equity, in general, softens banks’ constraint to issue 
subordinated debts with potential benefits for investors, a so-called sweetener, as well as higher yields of 
straight subordinated debts.   5
information. Taking account of this trade-off, we use both (i) the data as of the end of the 
previous fiscal year and (ii) average data between the previous and the current fiscal year. 
The explanatory variables are described in Table 1.10 We roughly divide those variables 
into the following three categories.11 The first category variables attempt to capture the needs for 
banks to issue subordinated debts for the enhancement of their Tier 2 capital under the Basel 
Accord. This category includes the capital/asset ratio on a book-value basis (X1) and the allowance 
ratio for credit losses (X2).12  A lower value of X1 and a higher value of X2 imply a higher need for 
the banks to issue subordinated debts.13 
The second category variables are used as screening devices for investors to discern 
between good and bad banks. These variables are essentially independent of the Basel Accord. This 
category includes the NPL ratio (X3), ROA and ROE (X4 and X5), growth rate of total deposits 
and loans (X6 and X7), and bank size measured by total deposits outstanding (X8). Particularly in 
the Japanese case during the period of financial instability, investors were likely to use the NPL 
ratio as a major risk indicator for Japanese banks. Thus, the NPL ratio is expected to take on a 
negative sign. On the other hand, other variables are expected to take on a positive sign. A higher 
                                                  
10  Birchler and Hancock [2004] and Covitz, Hancock, and Kwast [2004a,b] use the indicator variables of the 
composite supervisory ratings as proxies for pressure from regulatory supervisors, in addition to the proxies 
for banks’ default risk and their profitability, bond market conditions, and so on. They find that total assets, 
the indicator variable for successive issuances, and implied stock volatility are consistent determinants of U.S. 
bank's issuance decisions on subordinated debts. 
11  Another possible classification of the explanatory variables is whether each one is a demand-side or 
supply-side variable. Because of the identification problem between these two types of variables, we do not 
follow this kind of classification. 
12  Birchler and Hancock [2004] and Covitz, Hancock, and Kwast [2004a,b] use the capital/asset ratio as one 
of the proxies for default risk in that the higher the capital/asset ratio, the lower the leverage ratio and thus 
default risk. In this case, the expected sign of the capital/asset ratio is positive. In our analysis, on the other 
hand, the capital/asset ratio is used to measure the need to issue subordinated debts by banks and banks’ 
default risk is captured the NPL ratio from the consideration of the real-life behavior of Japanese banks. 
13  Bank of Japan [2005] mentions that the business model of Japanese regional banks seems to put priority 
on relationship banking. This implies these banks have incentives to forbear from prompt liquidation of 
damaged firms, which leads to a higher allowance ratio. These banks may need more capital buffer for 
potential write-offs of the NPLs with high allowance ratios. The expected sign of X2, therefore, is positive. 
Another possible interpretation of X2 is that a higher value of X2 implies an improved financial soundness 
of banks, given the level of the capital/asset ratio under the Basel Accord. If we follow this interpretation, 
the expected sign of X2 might be negative.     6
value of ROA and ROE (X4 and X5) indicates higher profitability for banks. The growth rate of 
total deposits (X6) is likely to be associated with the market discipline of depositors and the growth 
rate of total loans (X7) represents the overall growth potential of banks. Total deposits outstanding 
(X8) represents the overall size and thus the stability of bank management. Total deposits 
outstanding also aims to capture the publicity effect in that the larger the size of the bank, the more 
familiar investors are with that bank. 
The last category variables aim to control for market conditions in deciding whether or 
not the bank issues subordinated debts. We use the year-on-year absolute rate of change in the 
stock price of each individual bank (X9) and the year-on-year rate of change in the stock price of 
each bank relative to the TOPIX (X10). The absolute rate of change in stock prices (X9) changes 
the capital/asset ratio on a market-value basis, as well as reflects stock market conditions. On the 
other hand, the relative rate of change reflects only stock market conditions. We use X9 and X10 as 
interaction terms with the capital/asset ratio (X1). 
The underlying hypotheses associated with the interaction terms can be summarized as 
follows. First, a higher value of both X9 and X10 indicates favorable stock market conditions for 
issuing subordinated debts. This hypothesis is closely related to the market timing argument by 
Baker and Wurgler [2002]. If this hypothesis is accepted, then the interaction terms X1*X9 and 
X1*X10 should be negative, given that the sign of X1 is significantly negative. Second, a lower 
(higher) value of X9 indicates a lower (higher) capital/asset ratio on a market-value basis that is 
likely to raise (lower) the incentive to further issue subordinated debts. Thus, if this hypothesis is 
true, then the interaction term X1*X9 should have a positive sign. The expected signs of all the 
explanatory variables are shown in Table 2. Note that the expected sign of X1*X9 is indeterminate, 
while the expected sign of X1*X10 is negative, given that the sign of X1 is negative. 
Table 3 reports the mean and standard deviation of each variable classified in the first and   7
second categories for the following four periods; (i) full sample (2000–2005), (ii) 2000–2003, (iii) 
2004–2005, and (iv) 2003–2004. The period 2000–2003 corresponds to the period of instability in 
the Japanese banking system because of the NPL problem and the period of 2004–2005 
corresponds to the recovery phase from system instability. The period 2003–2004 corresponds to 
the transition period between these two distinct periods. 
It should be noted here that most of the second category variables, used as proxies for 
screening devices, experienced improvement in means and a decline in standard deviations. This 
result suggests that bank’s access to the primary market of subordinated debts becomes easier 
during the latter period than during the former period. 
 
3.  Empirical Results 
Tables 4 and 5 report the results of the pooled probit model.14 Because of high correlations 
between ROA and ROE (X4 and X5), and the growth rates of total deposits and loans (X6 and X7), 
we take the following strategy.15 First, we divide the models according to whether ROA (X4) or 
ROE (X5) is used as a proxy for profitability, and then specify the model (i) using the growth rate 
of total deposits (X6) or loans (X7), and (ii) with or without interaction terms between the 
capital/asset ratio (X1) and stock prices (X9 and X10). 
First, let us look at the full sample estimation shown in Tables 4 (i) and 5 (i). We use 
robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity clustering for each bank. For all of the 
specifications, the sign of X1 is significantly negative, while the allowance ratio for credit losses 
                                                  
14  We also estimated a random effects probit model, but the results of the likelihood test significantly 
rejected the random effects probit model against a pooled probit model. We further tried yearly dummies to 
control for macroeconomic factors that are common to every bank, but no significant results were obtained. 
Thus, we report the results from the pooled probit model. 
15  The correlation between X4 and X5 and between X6 and X7 is 0.42 and 0.92, respectively, in the case of 
the previous-year data, and 0.69 and 0.84, respectively, in the case of the average data.   8
(X2) is insignificant.16  This result suggests a strong incentive for the Japanese regional banks with a 
lower capital/asset ratio to issue subordinated debts by taking advantage of the current Basel 
Accord where the subordinated debts are counted as Tier 2 capital.   
Another interesting point here is the asymmetric effects of the absolute and relative 
changes in the stock prices for banks on the issuance decision, represented by the third category 
variables. Specifications 3, 4, 7, and 8 include these variables as interaction terms with X1. As is 
clearly shown by the average data, X1*X9 and X1*X10 have a significantly positive and negative 
sign, respectively.17  This result shows that if the market timing effect X1*X10 is controlled for, the 
sign of X1*X9 becomes significantly positive, which indicates the relevance of the hypothesis 
described in section 2. In summary, we find that a lower capital/asset ratio works as a strong 
incentive for banks to issue subordinated debts, and the magnitude of this incentive depends highly 
on both absolute and relative stock prices. 
Next, some of the second category variables show the expected results for the NPL ratio 
(X3), ROA (X4), and the total deposit outstanding (X8) in both data sets. ROE also has a 
significantly positive sign in the case of the average data. The NPL ratio (X3) with a significantly 
negative sign in almost all of the specifications suggests that investors pay considerable attention to 
that variable in assessing banks’ default risk. Besides, ROA (X4) has a significantly positive effect on 
the issuance decision of subordinated debts, and the coefficient for total deposits outstanding (X8) 
has a significantly positive sign. On the other hand, the growth rates of total deposits and loans (X6 
and X7) do not have a significant effect on the issuance condition in all cases. 
Second, let us look at the subsample estimation results. From Tables 4 and 5 ((ii) and (iii)), 
we can see that in both periods, X1 has a significantly negative sign for all of the specifications, but 
                                                  
16  Our estimation result for the capital/asset ratio (X1) is in marked contrast to the results for U.S. banks by 
Covitz, Hancock, and Kwast [2004a,b] and Birchler and Hancock [2004], who do not find any significant 
relationship between the capital/asset ratio and the issuance decision of subordinated debts. 
17  Similar results are obtained using the end-of-previous-fiscal-year data, too, although the estimated 
coefficients are less significant.   9
stock prices do not have consistent effects on the issuance decision. Regarding the second category 
variables, on the other hand, the results are totally different between 2000–2003 and 2004–2005. 
Particularly for the average data in the period 2000–2003, all of these variables except the growth 
rate of total loans are significant and of the expected sign. In the period 2004–2005, however, none 
of the variables have a significant expected sign. A similar result is observed for the 
end-of-previous-fiscal-year data in the later period. The data in the former period shows only the 
NPL ratio (X3) and total deposits outstanding (X8) have a significant expected sign.18 
This distinct difference in the results for the second category variables between these two 
periods may be interpreted in terms of the banks’ constraint to finance their Tier 2 capital via 
subordinated debt markets, which results from higher default risk and uncertainty as to the degree 
of risk. As we mentioned in the introduction, the Japanese banking system was very unstable 
following the bursting of the asset bubbles in the early 1990s until 2003 because of the NPL 
problem. Since 2004, however, NPL ratios have declined significantly and Japanese banks have 
regained stability. These structural changes are likely to exert influence on investors’ awareness and 
uncertainties about banks’ default risk. Indeed, as shown in Table 3, almost all of the second 
category variables have smaller standard deviations in the latter period, which implies a lower 
degree of uncertainty in this period. 
Another interesting point to note is that stock prices have a significant effect on issuance 
decision through the capital/asset ratio in the full sample estimation, particularly for the average 
data, while they have much less effect in both subperiods 2000–2003 and 2004–2005. This result 
implies that stock prices matter for the issuance decision of subordinated debts only when these 
two distinct periods overlap. Stock prices of Japanese banks had been on a consistent downtrend 
                                                  
18  A larger number of the second category variables that have a significant expected sign when we use the 
average data suggest that investors use recent information about banks’ financial standings in assessing banks’ 
default risk.   10
since late 1999, hitting bottom in early 2003, and then rising sharply toward the end of 2005. Thus, 
it seems that stock prices matter for the issuance decision around the turning point from a 
downtrend to uptrend, which is confirmed by the results for the transition period 2003–2004 
reported in Tables 4 (iv) and 5 (iv). In other words, the sub-periods of 2002–2003 and 2004–2005 
are too short to investigate the effects of stock price developments on the issuance decision. 
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper has empirically investigated the determinants of subordinated debt issuance by Japanese 
regional banks during the period 2000–2005 using a probit model. The empirical results suggest the 
following. 
(i)  Throughout the sample period, Japanese regional banks with a lower capital/asset ratio 
have a higher incentive to issue subordinated debts because they are counted as Tier 2 
capital under the Basel Accord. 
(ii)  During the period of instability in the Japanese banking system (2000–2003), investors 
tended to intensively use financial variables such as the NPL ratio, ROA, and total deposits 
outstanding to screen good banks from a pool of a number of both good and bad banks. 
The screening worked as a barrier to subordinated debt finance for bad banks. In this 
regard, market discipline worked in the Japanese banks’ subordinated debt primary market 
during this period of instability. 
(iii)  During the period after the banking system regained stability (2004–2005), investors tended 
to pay less attention to the above variables due mainly to the mitigated uncertainties 
regarding banks’ default risk. It seems relatively easy for Japanese regional banks to issue 
subordinate debts in this circumstance. This is likely to be the reason why many more 
banks issued subordinate debts in this period than in the preceding period.   11
Let us conclude this paper by discussing one possible concern that may be read from our 
result in the recent years (2004–2005). In this period, because interest rates have remained very low 
from a historical perspective in most of the industrialized economies, various types of investors 
have significantly increased their demand for “yields” particularly in Japan. This movement first 
began in credit instruments with relatively high credit ratings and then proceeded to those with 
lower credit ratings or subordinated debts. As a result, Japanese credit spreads with a BBB rating 
have barely covered ex post default risks, as shown by Baba et al. [2005]. The so-called “search for 
yield” behavior by Japanese investors might have obscured the true state of banks’ default risk in 
the subordinated debt primary market. In such a circumstance, inclusion of subordinated debts in 
the Tier 2 capital might soften the budget constraint of banks and lead to overlending, as argued by 
Hosono and Sakuragawa [2003], for instance. 
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Table 1: Definition of Variables 
 
Category Name Definition  Source 




X2    Allowance ratio for credit losses  Allowance for credit losses divided by non-performing and 
past due loans (%) 
Financial statements 
X3    Non-performing loan (NPL) ratio  Non-performing and past due loans divided by loans and 
bills discounted (%) 
Financial statements 
X4    Return on assets (ROA)  Operating income / total assets (%)  Financial statements 
X5    Return on equity (ROE)  Operating income / shareholders’ equity (%)  Financial statements 
X6    Growth rate of total deposits  Year-on-year growth rate of loans and bills discounted (%) Financial statements 
X7    Growth rate of total loans  Year-on-year growth rate of loans and bills discounted (%) Financial statements 
2
 
X8    Total deposits outstanding  Natural logarithm of total deposits outstanding Financial  statements 
X9    Absolute rate of change in stock 
price 




X10    Relative rate of change in stock 
price 
Year-on-year rate of change in stock price for each bank 
minus that of TOPIX (% point) 
Bloomberg 
Notes: 1. Data is on a nonconsolidated basis. 
2. The gross number of regional banks over the sample period 2000–2005 is 498, of which 42 (456) are issuance (nonissuance) banks. Including X9/X10 decreases 
the number of sample banks to 391, of which 36 (355) are issuance (nonissuance) banks.   14
Table 2: Expected Signs of Explanatory Variables 
 
Category Name  Expected  sign 
X1(Capital/asset ratio)  Negative 




X6(Growth rate of total deposits)  Positive 
X7(Growth rate of total loans)  Positive 
2 
X8(Total deposits outstanding)  Positive 
X1*X9(Absolute rate of change in stock price)  Positive or negative 
3 
X1*X10(Relative rate of change in stock price)  Negative (given the negative sign of X1) 
   15
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Balance Sheet Variables 
(i) Capital/asset ratio 
 Mean  Standard  deviation 
Full Sample: 2000–2005  4.677 4.732 1.094 1.085 
Subsample: 2000–2003  4.619 4.651 1.087 1.038 
Subsample: 2004–2005  4.794 4.895 1.101 1.161 
Subsample: 2003–2004  4.603 4.701 1.070 1.075 
(ii) Allowance ratio for credit losses 
 Mean  Standard  deviation 
Full Sample: 2000–2005  34.928 33.967 12.881 11.323 
Subsample: 2000–2003  35.910 34.161 13.489 11.548 
Subsample: 2004–2005  32.947 33.576 11.340 10.878 
Subsample: 2003–2004  31.998 32.440 11.163 10.918 
(iii) NPL ratio 
 Mean  Standard  deviation 
Full Sample: 2000–2005  6.985 6.946 2.788 2.658 
Subsample: 2000–2003  7.190 7.375 2.962 2.761 
Subsample: 2004–2005  6.572 6.080 2.353 2.202 
Subsample: 2003–2004  7.642 7.115 2.696 2.472 
(iv) ROA 
 Mean  Standard  deviation 
Full Sample: 2000–2005  0.618 0.635 0.246 0.254 
Subsample: 2000–2003  0.584 0.612 0.250 0.257 
Subsample: 2004–2005  0.687 0.680 0.222 0.243 
Subsample: 2003–2004  0.651 0.688 0.261 0.224 
(v) ROE 
 Mean  Standard  deviation 
Full Sample: 2000–2005  14.241 14.158 12.338 7.120 
Subsample: 2000–2003  13.760 13.807 14.375 7.036 
Subsample: 2004–2005  15.211 14.865 6.451 7.256 
Subsample: 2003–2004  14.939 15.536 7.247 6.605 
(vi) Growth rate of total deposits 
 Mean  Standard  deviation 
Full Sample: 2000–2005  1.033 1.014 2.953 2.358 
Subsample: 2000–2003  0.829 0.826 3.199 2.492 
Subsample: 2004–2005  1.446 1.392 2.335 2.017 
Subsample: 2003–2004  1.049 1.209 2.700 2.000 
(vii) Growth rate of total loans 
 Mean  Standard  deviation 
Full Sample: 2000–2005  –0.308 0.009 3.175 2.529 
Subsample: 2000–2003  –0.752 –0.463 3.133 2.406 
Subsample: 2004–2005  0.588 0.962 3.077 2.509 
Subsample: 2003–2004  –0.154 0.181 3.368 2.530 
(viii) Total deposits outstanding 
 Mean  Standard  deviation 
Full Sample: 2000–2005  14.141 14.146 0.874 0.876 
Subsample: 2000–2003  14.131 14.135 0.871 0.873 
Subsample: 2004–2005  14.162 14.168 0.883 0.885 
Subsample: 2003–2004  14.146 14.153 0.885 0.885 
Note: The left-hand side figure uses the end-of-previous-year data and the right-hand side figure uses the 
average data between the end of previous fiscal year and current fiscal year.   16
Table 4: Probit Models (End-of-Previous-Fiscal-Year Data) 
(i) Full Sample: 2000–2005 
  Using ROA as proxy for profitability  Using ROE as proxy for profitability 
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Num.  of  Obs  498 498 391 391 498 498 391 391 
Log likelihood  –122.793  –124.306 –99.388  –99.437  –127.125 –127.856 –103.590 –103.557 
Pseudo  R-squared   0.148   0.144   0.173   0.172   0.117   0.112   0.138   0.138 
(ii) Subsample: 2000–2003 
  Using ROA as proxy for profitability  Using ROE as proxy for profitability 
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Num.  of  Obs  333 333 262 262 333 333 262 262 
Log likelihood  –36.147  –36.139  –32.716  –32.629 –36.940 –36.589 –32.646 –32.640 
Pseudo  R-squared   0.300   0.300   0.283   0.285   0.287   0.292   0.285   0.285 
Notes:    1.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
  2.  Figures in square brackets are robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity clustering 
for each bank 
  3.  See Table 1 for the definition of variables.   17
(iii) Subsample: 2004–2005 
  Using ROA as proxy for profitability  Using ROE as proxy for profitability 
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Num.  of  Obs  165 165 129 129 165 165 129 129 
Log  likelihood  –68.808 –68.969 –52.023 –52.064 –68.876 –69.035 –52.299 –52.331 
Pseudo  R-squared   0.121   0.118   0.180   0.179   0.120   0.117   0.175   0.175 
(iv) Subsample: 2003–2004 
  Using ROA as proxy for profitability  Using ROE as proxy for profitability 
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Num.  of  Obs  164 164 128 128 164 164 128 128 
Log  likelihood  –38.368 –37.976 –28.841 –26.936 –38.136 –37.576 –28.803 –26.744 
Pseudo  R-squared   0.198   0.206   0.314   0.359   0.203   0.215   0.315   0.364 
Notes:  1.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
  2.  Figures in square brackets are robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity clustering 
on each bank. 
  3.  See Table 1 for the definition of variables. 
   18
Table 5: Probit Models (Average Data) 
(i) Full Sample: 2000–2005 
  Using ROA as proxy for profitability  Using ROE as proxy for profitability 
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Num.  of  Obs  498 498 391 391 498 498 391 391 
Log likelihood  –116.801  –116.721 –85.451  –86.494  –116.836 –116.670 –85.927  –86.939 
Pseudo  R-squared   0.189   0.190   0.289   0.280   0.189   0.190   0.285   0.277 
(ii) Subsample: 2000–2003 
  Using ROA as proxy for profitability  Using ROE as proxy for profitability 
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Num.  of  Obs  333 333 262 262 333 333 262 262 
Log likelihood  –29.345  –33.688  –25.807  –29.589 –30.255 –34.658 –26.452 –30.416 
Pseudo  R-squared   0.432   0.348   0.435   0.352   0.414   0.329   0.420   0.334 
Notes:  1.  *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
  2.  Figures in square brackets are robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity clustering 
on each bank. 
  3.  See Table 1 for the definition of variables.   19
(iii) Subsample: 2004–2005 
  Using ROA as proxy for profitability  Using ROE as proxy for profitability 
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Num.  of  Obs  165 165 129 129 165 165 129 129 
Log  likelihood  –69.077 –66.777 –51.491 –51.210 –66.937 –66.651 –51.560 –51.269 
Pseudo  R-squared   0.143   0.146   0.188   0.193   0.144   0.148   0.187   0.192 
(iv) Subsample: 2003–2004 
  Using ROA as proxy for profitability  Using ROE as proxy for profitability 
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Num.  of  Obs  164 164 128 128 164 164 128 128 
Log  likelihood  –37.270 –37.219 –26.942 –26.997 –37.445 –37.353 –26.666 –26.761 
Pseudo  R-squared   0.221   0.222   0.359   0.358   0.217   0.219   0.366   0.364 
Notes: 1. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
2. Figures in square brackets are robust standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity clustering on 
each bank. 
3. See Table 1 for the definition of variables. 